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In numerous countries where peace agreements have held without a relapse into conflict 
beyond the critical period, the structural factors lying at the source of the original conflict 
remain unaddressed and continue to fester. From Cambodia and Guatemala to East 
Timor, serious issues related to land tenure, property rights, rule of law, political 
participation and transitional justice continue to pose serious challenges to peace 
consolidation and peacebuilding.1  
 
 The post-Cold War era has been marked by a proliferation of persistent intra-state 
conflicts, many of which have frustrated international attempts to promote peaceful conflict 
resolution and the emergence of more peaceful societies.  By many measures, international 
peacebuilding operations have achieved only mixed success or have simply failed, and nearly 
half of all “post-conflict” countries see a return of violent struggle.2  This chapter argues that an 
important reason for the failure of multilateral peacebuilding interventions is that these initiatives 
incorporate a set of assumptions about the benefits of market liberalization that are inaccurate.  
More effective intervention to end violent conflicts requires efforts to better understand how 
economic globalization impacts the dynamics of civil wars.  Contemporary violent conflicts are 
not purely localized phenomena but rather they are deeply embedded within a global context of 
complex political and economic relationships.  Strategic peacebuilding cannot occur without 
greater attention to these relationships and how they reproduce power and inequality in the 
global political and economic systems.   
 Recent studies on the impacts of multilateral peacebuilding initiatives have concluded 
that these interventions have, on the whole, not been terribly successful at helping societies 
transition from states of civil war to long-term, sustainable peace.3  Two important recent studies 
of peacebuilding operations—those by Collier et al.4 and Paris5 -- conclude that future 
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interventions must subordinate market-liberalization policies to those that strengthen the 
capacities of institutions to manage societal conflicts.  Paris, for instance, calls his proposed 
strategy “institutionalization before liberalization.”  But I would argue that these studies don’t go 
far enough in their prescriptions because they cling to two important assumptions.  First, they 
treat market liberalization and political liberalization, or “market democracy,” as inherently 
linked and complementary processes, both of which are seen as essential to peacebuilding work.  
Second, they see economic liberalization as a central element of peacebuilding, even while they 
argue for its more gradual introduction in post-conflict settings.  While there may indeed be 
relationships between economic liberalization and the conditions that foster peace, and while 
open markets might be associated with more open political systems, there is considerable debate 
among social scientists about the nature of these relationships.  Market liberalization can proceed 
in highly authoritarian contexts, and highly democratic countries may in fact limit their 
participation in global markets in response to democratic pressures.  Moreover, existing analyses 
show that economic liberalization can in fact undermine efforts to rebuild social institutions and 
foster political liberalization in war-torn societies.6  This chapter interrogates some key 
assumptions behind contemporary peacebuilding operations and the proposals to strengthen 
them, exploring whether or not the conventional wisdom about the relationship of market 
liberalization to peacebuilding processes is consistent with existing evidence.   
What becomes apparent in this analysis is that much research in the area of peacebuilding 
fails to address adequately questions of power and its distribution.7  Sidelining power questions 
can often serve on a practical level to expedite cease-fire agreements and on an analytical level to 
generate more parsimonious models of conflict dynamics.  But asymmetries of power can mask 
structural sources of conflicts that can resurface over time.  Therefore, by failing to address 
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power imbalances, conflict analysts and practitioners seeking to reduce violent conflict will fail 
to identify effective peacebuilding strategies.  “Strategic peacebuilding” should imply, therefore, 
a central focus on questions of how power is distributed among conflicting parties along with 
intervention strategies that seek to reduce the inequities in power that can lead to violent conflict. 
Globalization has meant an increasing concentration of political and economic power at 
the global level.8  Because of this, strategic peacebuilding should also adopt a perspective that 
embeds the local within a broader social and political context.  As global integration expands 
along numerous dimensions, it becomes even more important that conflict analysts adopt a 
global systemic framework.  Contemporary states are embedded within complex sets of 
economic and political relationships, as are an array of other transnational actors such as 
transnational corporations and civil society groups.  Conflicts within states are often reflections 
of these broader sets of ties, and indeed these apparently localized conflicts depend upon 
resource flows that extend well beyond national borders.9  Andrew Hurrell describes a "triple 
anchorage of states" in the international system of states, in the global capitalist economy, and in 
transnational civil society.10  These webs of interdependence shape conflicts within as well as 
between states, and effective interventions to end violent conflicts must account for these 
relationships between local and global contexts. 
 Peacebuilding missions have been described as “transmission mechanisms” of neoliberal 
models of the state.11  Paris argues that, far from being technical and neutral exercises in conflict 
management, multilateral peacebuilding operations advance liberal market democracy as the 
preferred model for domestic governance, advancing a "world revolution of Western 
liberalism."12  They do so by: 1) encouraging parties to include political and economic 
liberalization measures into peace agreements; 2) providing technical assistance in constitution-
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writing and other governance tasks; 3) imposing political and economic conditionalities on 
parties in exchange for financial and other assistance; and 4) by performing governance 
functions in transitional or failed state contexts.13   
 Significantly, this transfer of governance templates is from the rich, northern, core of the 
global economy to the comparatively poor, southern, and post-colonial periphery.  In short, 
peacebuilding itself reflects a long history of inequality in the world system, and it incorporates 
various forms of power –including structural, institutional, and symbolic power—that remains 
largely unexamined in existing literature.  Robinson demonstrates, for instance, how 
peacekeeping operations in Nicaragua and Haiti were used to reorganize government practices to 
make them conform to the needs of globalizing capitalist interests.14  Thus, peacekeeping can be 
seen as one mechanism for the development of what Robinson calls the “neoliberal state,” or the 
transformation of national states into entities that support the trade liberalization agenda of 
globalized capital.15  In this sense, peacekeeping operations are a part of the “revolution from 
above,” that helped expand the global economy in recent decades.16  Strategic peacebuilding 
approaches, therefore, require a critical analysis of how power is reflected and reproduced in the 
operation of peace intervention missions.  They also demand greater attention to the assumptions 
behind these missions and their objectives.   
 A critical look at peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations suggests that they are 
designed largely to protect if not to promote the interests of the northern, core states that enjoy 
privileged influence in global institutional contexts.  Peacebuilding interventions—like other 
international initiatives such as global trade agreements and multilateral development lending-- 
have helped to reproduce neoliberal economic policies.  Unlike global trade and financial 
institutions, however, peacebuilding missions advocate economic liberalization not as an end in 
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itself, but rather as a (presumed) means of promoting economic growth that will reduce violent 
conflict.  However, relatively little empirical research has been done to critically examine this 
assumption that economic liberalization will actually contribute to peacebuilding aims.  
Also integral to the models of governance favored by market liberalization proponents 
are policies that reduce state regulatory capacities and expand incentives and opportunities for 
international investment.  By reducing the capacities of states to define and defend public goods 
and by limiting the policy space available for democratic decision making, such practices may 
obstruct efforts to build stronger institutions and foster democracy in post-war states.  Given 
these possible tensions between the practices of peacebuilding missions and the needs of 
societies emerging from violent conflicts, I examine four key assumptions in peacebuilding 
research and practice:  First that market liberalization leads to economic growth; second that 
growth will solve the underlying problem of inequality that gives rise to conflicts; third that a 
neoliberal model of the state will be effective at promoting peace; and that multilateral peace and 
security can be improved without addressing fundamental inequities in the global economic 
order.   
 
Market Liberalization and Growth 
 
In their important World Bank-sponsored study of contemporary internal conflicts, 
Collier and his colleagues conclude that the "key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic 
development."17  Societies plagued with internal violence are very often those mired in poverty.  
Thus, a key strategy for breaking what Collier et al. call the “conflict trap” is to promote market 
liberalization, expanding the country’s access to world markets as a means of promoting 
economic growth.  But will market liberalization generate the growth needed to transform war-
torn societies?  
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Debates about the effects of trade liberalization and economic growth yield conflicting 
results, but the bulk of new work that is emerging suggests that initial optimism about trade 
liberalization’s prospects were substantially over-stated.18  For instance, the World Bank recently 
reduced its projections of global gains from trade liberalization by nearly two-thirds, from $832 
billion to $287 billion.  And the projected benefits to the developing countries were reduced by 
more than 80% from $539 billion to $90 billion.19  The UNDP Human Development Report, 
moreover, states that “[t]he evidence to support the proposition that import liberalization is 
automatically good for growth is weak.”20  The analysis of trade offered in the UNDP report 
suggests that, while trade liberalization might indeed be associated with growth in some 
countries at some times, there is no direct link between economic liberalization and growth.  
Other variables are important for explaining when liberalization helps generate growth and when 
it cannot.21  There is, in short, no automatic relationship between the two.  Thus, despite two 
decades of radical economic liberalization policies and a doubling of world exports since the 
early 1990s, we still see a “persistent pool of non-developing low-income countries” that 
threatens world peace and stability.22 
 Another pattern that emerges from data on global trends in imports and exports suggests 
that the benefits of trade for poor countries are not at all comparable to the benefits experienced 
by rich countries.  This should lead us to seriously question trade liberalization as an effective 
prescription for helping poor countries emerge from conflict traps.  While developing countries 
are devoting substantially more of their national resources and energies to promoting exports, 
they have not achieved substantial gains in terms of global market shares.23  For instance, despite 
a growth in exports between 40-55% African countries’ share of world markets grew by just 
0.3% in the 1990s.  And India’s share of world trade went up just 0.7% despite average annual 
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growth of 10% during the 1990s.24  This type of economic growth will only contribute to ever-
growing inequalities between countries as well as within them.25  If one considers the 
environmental and social costs associated with developing countries’ increased participation in 
world markets, there is little overall benefit from trade in terms of expanding the resources 
available to most of the population in these regions. 
More disturbing, however, is that the higher-income developing countries are finding that 
growth from trade is not readily sustained.  Weisbrot26 and Bello27 found that economic growth 
rates in Latin America were markedly higher before the era of neoliberal reforms than they were 
after countries opened their borders.  And many successful globalizers are finding their place in 
the highly stratified global production system slipping.  Thus, countries like Mexico and Brazil 
are losing high value-added manufacturing jobs to Korea and China, and India’s high tech sector 
is losing ground to lower-paying industries such as textiles and apparel.28  And globally, the 
terms of trade for developing countries have been declining over time: overall, declines for poor 
country terms of trade are -.74%; for India, the figure is -1.62%; and for Brazil, -.18%.29 This 
record shows that economic policies designed to encourage foreign investment do not necessarily 
produce the economic growth expected by neoliberal policy analysts. While economic growth—
that is, expanding the resource pie for all residents of countries destroyed by war—is clearly vital 
to peace, there is sufficient evidence to warrant a search for strategies that don’t rely on wealth 
trickling down to local communities from foreign investors and through export-based production 
and trade (see, Sambanis chapter, this volume). Since sustained peacebuilding work depends 
upon a stable and predictable social and economic environment, policies that link conflict-torn 
countries to a volatile and uncertain global economy are—as is becoming increasingly apparent--
fraught with trouble. 
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 Critics of neoliberal policies often charge proponents of economic liberalization with 
engaging in what has been called “NAFTA math”—that is, reporting the economic gains from 
trade while neglecting to account for the associated costs, such as job losses, environmental 
destruction, and vulnerability to international markets.  For instance, Public Citizen pointed out 
that the U.S. Trade Representative’s reports on the job gains from NAFTA showed only those 
jobs created in export industries.  The USTR forgot to subtract those jobs lost in industries that 
lost out to competition from new flows of imports.  “NAFTA math” is rampant in many official 
accounts of trade’s benefits,30 and those concerned with finding appropriate policy mechanisms 
to address the problems of violent conflict and fragile states should be careful to note these 
inflated assessments of trade benefits. In short, a “responsibility to protect” people in war-torn 
countries seems to require a far more vigorous search for better strategies to advance economic 
growth and more equitable distribution of wealth in war-torn countries. 
 Wise and Gallagher31 and Weisbrot et al.32 note how trade proponents overlook important 
costs that liberalization imposes on poor countries.  They examine the costs to developing 
countries of trade liberalization policies in terms of lost tax revenues from tariffs.  They conclude 
that developing countries would lose more than $60 billion in tariff revenue under the non-
agricultural market access (NAMA) agreement within the World Trade Organization, around ten 
times the projected gains from trade liberalization.  In countries where as much as 40% of 
government revenues come from tariffs, this cost is substantial, to say the least.  It also will limit 
the capacities of poor governments to operate in the best of conditions, and thus we might re-
think whether such policies are desirable for governments emerging from internal wars. 
 In sum, the evidence linking trade openness to economic growth are mixed, and there is 
no direct link between expanding a country’s access to world markets and growing the economic 
 9 
pie that can help win over combatants and promote sustainable peace.  Moreover, the 
experiences of the global north countries in the area of trade liberalization serve as poor 
predictors of the likely effects of trade on poor countries. The evidence shows consistently that 
the global south has enjoyed fewer and less consistent benefits from trade liberalization than 
their richer, early industrializing counterparts.  Thus, Collier et al. are right to conclude that 
priority must be given to policies that promote peace over those that promote economic growth 
through markets.  But we might ask whether the World Bank prescriptions are generating the 
kind of economic growth that can really lead to long-term peace. The mounting evidence that 
policies for economic liberalization are not generating the intended growth effects might help 
explain the past failures of peacebuilding operations.  
Globalization’s critics—whose ranks are gaining ever-larger numbers of policy elites-- 
have developed elaborate analyses and feasible policy prescriptions aimed at remedying the 
shortfalls of neoliberal economic models.33 The essence of these approaches is a focus on 
production for local needs, local ownership and control, and attention to environmental and 
social contexts. These types of strategies can be part of an effort to quickly restore public 
services and to generate economic returns that are needed to encourage disarmament and conflict 
de-escalation. They have an advantage of helping increase the direct stakes all citizens would 
have in post-war peace agreements. So while growth and service restoration may take a bit 
longer, the process of engaging local communities and providing even limited resources to 
encourage local engagement and entrepreneurship helps build confidence and mobilizes local 
skills and energy in the peacebuilding process. 
 
Economic Liberalization and Inequality 
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Collier and his colleagues found that the countries at greatest risk of civil war also 
experienced high levels of inequality.34  However, none of the study’s numerous 
recommendations for improving peacebuilding work addresses this specific problem.  Instead, 
there is an implicit assumption that the problem of inequality will be solved by policies that 
foster economic growth.  This may be a valid assumption, but given that inequality is strongly 
linked to the escalation of conflicts, it bears greater scrutiny than the Collier study gives it.  This 
section examines the question of whether and how economic liberalization affects patterns of 
inequality.  
Economic orthodoxy links poverty reduction to economic growth.  The conventional 
economic wisdom says that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” that a growing economic pie will enrich 
all of society, that the benefits of growth will “trickle down” to generate other social benefits 
such as poverty reduction, environmental improvements, and the like.  Thus, if economic 
liberalization generates growth, and growth helps reduce inequality, then economic liberalization 
is a good policy prescription for war-torn societies.  But if economic liberalization does not 
generate more equitable distributions of wealth, and especially if it exacerbates inequality, then 
policy makers and analysts must seriously re-think its role in post-war contexts. 
How has global economic liberalization impacted inequality in the world?  While it is 
difficult to identify the specific causal variables, we have considerable evidence showing that 
economic globalization has had either no direct effect on inequality or that it may be contributing 
to rising inequality within and between countries.  The UNDP recently reported that "for a 
majority of countries [economic] globalization is a story of divergence and marginalization."35  
Global inequality has grown over recent decades of economic globalization, and now the richest 
10%  of the world population controls more than half the world’s income, while the bottom 40% 
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enjoy just 5% of world income.36  This inequality is even greater when measures of wealth are 
used in place of income.  The UNDP data show that inequality in the global south is on the rise, 
and that this in turn, is slowing economic growth and curbing efforts at poverty reduction.  The 
report argues—along with many social scientists and economists-- that inequality is a challenge 
to the international community, since it not only impedes market efficiency and economic 
growth, but it also undermines democracy and social cohesion—the very conditions that are 
required to reduce the likelihood that social conflicts will escalate into violent confrontations.   
The 2005 Human Development Report paints a far gloomier picture of economic 
globalization than many previous official documents had.  But the evidence is consistent with 
findings of scholars and other critics of trade liberalization as a policy panacea.  Clearly the 
problem of persistent poverty and underdevelopment is less a function of scarce resources—
indeed the world is far richer by many material measures than it was in prior decades or 
centuries— than of the unequal distribution of those resources.37  In the previous section, I 
highlighted evidence showing that the benefits of trade were not equally distributed among the 
world’s countries, and that the poorest countries and regions were gaining less than rich ones.  
This inequality in shares of world trade is reproduced in other measures of economic inequality.  
For instance, sociologists have found a consistent trend towards rising inequality within 
countries as well as between them.38, 39  This growing gap between the rich and poor in the 
world, moreover, corresponds to the timing of neoliberal policy initiatives, which were first 
launched in the mid-1980s and disseminated through means such as international trade 
agreements and structural adjustment lending programs of the World Bank and IMF.  The UNDP 
(2005) reports a current measure of world inequality, the Gini coefficient, of .67.40   This 
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coefficient reflects a highly unequal global system with levels of inequality higher than those of 
the most unequal (and unstable) countries of the world.41   
 Although rising inequality is associated with the timing of global economic liberalization, 
we should not automatically assume a causal relationship, since a wide range of variables clearly 
affect global economic distributions.  What can we say about whether and how economic 
globalization might be affecting inequality?  The New Economics Foundation examined the 
extent to which the economic growth linked to neoliberal policies benefited the poorest segments 
of national populations.  Their conclusions correspond with the UNDP report cited above, and 
they go further to argue that the 1980s and 1990s generated “anti-poor” growth: A very small 
and declining percentage of the world’s economic growth went to those groups in greatest need.  
People living on less than $1/day received just around 2% of the benefits from economic growth 
in the 1980s, and this declined to less than 1% by 2000.  Those people living on $2/day enjoyed 
about 5.5% of the growth in the early 1980s but this share declined to just 3.1% by 200042 Thus, 
just as the benefits of trade liberalization were reduced for poor countries, the benefits of 
economic growth are small and diminishing for poor people.  The declines come as economic 
liberalization policies have expanded. 
 But does this association between economic globalization and rising inequality suggest a 
causal connection?  We need theoretical work to show whether there is reason to think that 
economic liberalization is implicated in persistent and rising inequality.  Sociologists identify 
labor market dynamics as an important part of this puzzle, and both empirical and theoretical 
work here shows that global economic integration has been systematically undermining the 
power of working people relative to the owners of capital.43 A major reason for this is that the 
policies pursued by the global financial institutions have pressed for the opening of national 
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borders to flows of goods and services while allowing countries to close their borders to flows of 
people.  This creates market distortions in the supply and demand of labor that artificially 
suppresses costs while also curtailing the possibilities for working people to benefit from 
expanding trade relationships.  This has meant dramatic declines in rates of unionization around 
the world, and enhanced vulnerability of workers to job losses directly linked to import/export 
sectors.  In the U.S., for instance, three-quarters of those workers losing their jobs due to trade-
related competition re-entered the labor market at lower wages than they previously earned.44 
And workers in the U.S. are comparatively powerful politically, so these losses are likely to be 
far greater in countries of the global south. 
 Weak labor rights mean more than simply a reduction in the benefits from economic 
liberalization that accrue to the poorest segments of the population.  They also mean that a 
disproportionate share of the costs of liberalization is borne by the poorest people in society.45 
Rather than helping to benefit the world’s poorest people, the policies of economic liberalization 
tend to exacerbate the hardships faced by those most in need.  Do the relatively poor, whose 
ranks may be growing due to rising global inequality, have a stake in a system that promotes 
expanded economic liberalization without specific efforts to remedy inequality?  This is an 
important question for peacebuilding proponents to ask, since groups that are excluded from 
economic rewards can more readily be mobilized into violent opposition movements.  Thus, 
Paris’s analysis of post-conflict peace agreements concludes that more must be done to prioritize 
efforts to address the problem of inequality over the implementation of traditional market 
liberalization policies.46  
 Not only do inequality and the systematic reduction in the political power of working 
people undermine the prospects for stable peace agreements, but contemporary inequality also 
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helps fuel wars.  Collier and his colleagues argue that the ability of combatants in civil wars to 
field armies is enhanced under conditions of high unemployment.  And both theory and 
empirical studies of the effects of economic liberalization show that unemployment is at least a 
temporary consequence, as losses in globally ‘uncompetitive’ industries are made up by new 
growth in exports.  But experience to date suggests that the losses in employment outweigh 
employment gains in newly emerging sectors, at least in the short- and medium- terms.47  If 
societies at peace have trouble adapting their employment sectors to the needs of the global 
economy, then those plagued with internal conflict will have great difficulty developing policies 
to promote high employment when they must open their markets to compete with foreign 
imports.  Thus, the employment disruptions caused by market liberalization may in themselves 
help prolong rather than curtail civil wars. 
 The persistence and especially the increases of inequality in the global system are serious 
threats to both localized peacebuilding efforts and to global peace.48 They are threats because 
they undermine the legitimacy and authority of existing institutions.  As Hurrell argues, 
hierarchical modes of governance cost in terms of both legitimacy and efficiency (2005), and the 
conflicts we’re seeing in the world since the end of the Cold War are likely reflections of this 
legitimacy crisis.  More must be done to address this crisis and tackle the problem of inequality 
to provide the “political prerequisites for meaningful global moral community.”49  
Thus, it would seem that policies aiming explicitly to enlarge the share of world and 
national income going to poor households would be far more effective at reducing poverty than 
are growth-oriented policies, which treat poverty-reduction as a by-product of growth.  This 
would require that peacbuilding initiatives integrate distribution effects into their policy 
designs.50 This is obviously more difficult in the short-term, since it requires fundamental 
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transformation of power relations, but it is essential for both the aim of economic development 
and for sustainable peacebuilding.  As the UNDP concludes in regard to Guatemala: 
No export growth strategy in Guatemala is likely to produce substantive benefits for 
human development without deep structural reforms to reduce inequalities and extend 
opportunity through the redistribution of land and other productive assets, increased 
public spending for the poor and targeted programmes aimed at breaking down the 
barriers facing indigenous people.  Such measures will ultimately require a change in the 
distribution of political power in Guatemala.51 
 
Ultimately, strategic peacebuilding must be about the redistribution of power (and resources) in 
society.  Walton and Seddon concluded from their study of protests in global south countries 
against the austerity measures imposed by global financial institutions that these protests 
reflected a trend towards growing pressure for democratic reforms against the neoliberal,   
“bourgeois” form of democracy [that is] more concerned with free trade than individual 
freedoms, more attentive to property than human rights, and downright skeptical about 
the social progress promised by earlier developmental states in contrast to the economic 
progress now promised by the market.52  
 
In short, the persistent inequality in today’s world means that large numbers of people lack a 
stake in the current system.  The prevention of violence on the part of those denied the benefits 
of globalization will require either new efforts to include marginalized groups in social and 
economic life or even higher levels of coercion to repress dissent.  There is little evidence that 
proposals to expand economic liberalization without explicit attempts to address the unequal 
distribution of resources and opportunities will generate lasting peace. 
 
 
Peace and the Neoliberal State 
 Effective states are seen as crucial to sustaining peace agreements at the local level as 
well as to maintaining regional and global peace and security.53 At the same time, peacebuilding 
prescriptions emphasizing economic liberalization may be undermining the ability of war-torn 
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societies to re-establish capable and effective national states.  Economic globalization has 
encouraged governments to adopt policies to promote international trade and investment.  One 
way they have done this is through attaching conditionalities to international loans issued by the 
World Bank and IMF requiring policy changes favoring international investment and trade.  
Many of these policies are also integrated into post-war peacebuilding agreements as well, often 
as prerequisites for obtaining international assistance.   
These conditionalities – known as “structural adjustment policies”54—vary, but their key 
requirements include:  reductions in public spending, privatization of public assets, government 
support for export industries, guarantees for international investors, and the elimination of 
domestic wage and price controls.55 By “structurally adjusting” borrowing states, the policies 
effectively help transform national states into what Robinson calls “neoliberal states” whose 
domestic markets are more fully integrated into the global economy.56 In practice, what these 
policies do is reduce the capacities and governing role of the state while expanding the influence 
of international investors and global markets in the society.57 They also shift power away from 
representative institutions, workers, and consumers and towards international investors and 
export industries.58  
 A growing body of research questions the effectiveness of structural adjustment policies 
for promoting economic growth and other benefits.59 Summarizing this research, Paris concludes 
that:   
Twenty years after the advent of structural adjustment, the quarrel over [the influence of 
these programs on economic growth and levels of distributional inequality] remains 
largely unresolved; Neither the IMF nor the World Bank has been able to demonstrate 
convincingly that structural-adjustment programs promote economic growth, and the 
precise relationship between these programs and levels of poverty and distributional 
inequality is still hotly contested."60  
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Even more importantly, the policies promoted by multilateral financial institutions may in fact be 
contributing to human rights violations, thereby protracting conflicts while also undermining 
possibilities for economic growth.  Abouharb and Cingranelli, for instance, analyzed the effects 
of international financial policies on human rights practices, and they found that the structural 
adjustment policies advanced by the World Bank were associated with higher levels of violations 
of physical integrity rights, including freedoms from torture, political imprisonment, extra-
judicial killing, and arbitrary disappearances.61 
 Despite this dubious record, structural adjustment policies continue to be integrated into 
international lending agreements and peace agreements, either through multilateral institutions or 
through bilateral pressures from the countries that are primary sources of official aid and private 
investment.62  These practices are counter-productive to peacebuilding work, since they limit the 
policy space available to governments that must prioritize the building or rebuilding of 
democratic institutions and the expansion of popular commitments to peace agreements.  Rather 
than emphasizing these important goals, structural adjustment policies prioritize the expansion of 
foreign investment and market liberalization.  The effects of these policies on democratic 
institution-building are seen as secondary to the aim of expanding market liberalization as a 
means of enhancing economic growth.  But a critical look at these policies suggests that effective 
peacebuilding work may require a fundamentally different approach to structuring national 
institutions. 
 Kaldor and Luckham’s analysis of post-Cold War conflicts identifies a generalized 
phenomenon that they argue is “almost the reverse of state and nation-building.”63  They see the 
practices associated with economic globalization as contributing to the delegitimation of public 
authority that is fueling the escalation and proliferation of “new wars.”  They conclude that the 
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only effective way to resist these new wars is to engage in systematic efforts to democratize 
politics and restore legitimate political authority.  While Sambanis (this volume) calls for caution 
in this regard, the point that locals must have a stake in the economic choices that will define 
post-war development remains valid. International intervention can be designed to maintain a 
larger range of choice and control for the people in countries recovering from war, thereby 
creating incentives for locals to engage in peacebuilding processes. This prescription, however, 
is fundamentally different from that promoted by conventional peacebuilding interventions, 
which encourage the pursuit of economic growth as the main prerequisite to peace.  Neoliberal 
states that are characterized by very limited policy space, by reduced capacity to regulate social 
actors, and by policy programs encouraging profit-seeking over other social aims are unlikely to 
build public authority and reverse this trend. 
 Typical peacebuilding prescriptions reduce the range of policy choices available in post-
conflict states, thereby obstructing efforts to build legitimate democratic institutions.  Most states 
in the global south—whether or not they have experienced internal wars—have been forced to 
negotiate limits to their national sovereignty in return for international financing.64  Countries 
that borrow money from the World Bank or IMF and that undergo other international 
interventions such as internationally enforced peace agreements are not free to determine what 
economic programs they pursue.  Rather than being subject to democratic mechanisms of 
deliberation and public accountability, major economic decisions are often left to elites or to 
technical experts acting outside of public scrutiny.65  While such policies may seem logical from 
the perspective of professional economists, they effectively depoliticize decisions that are at the 
heart of most societies—those affecting the fundamental organization of economic life and the 
distribution and use of societal resources.  Thus, some of the most important decisions that 
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govern any society are effectively withdrawn from the public sphere.  This constraining of the 
effective policy space undermines the abilities of post-war societies to win the loyalties and 
confidence of citizens.  This is true even where there are successful steps towards elections and 
other steps at democratization.  For a democratic state that lacks authority and capacity to shape 
decisions that affect people’s lives is an oxymoron.  
In addition to limited space for economic policy deliberation, neoliberal states are also 
characterized by reduced capacities for regulating economic and other activities within their 
borders.  Peter Evans refers to this model of the modern state as the “lean, mean state,” since it 
emphasizes coercive capacities necessary for the protection of private property and promotion of 
social stability over social welfare.  This reduction in state capacities comes at a time when we 
find an unprecedented concentration of wealth and power in the hands of private entities such as 
transnational corporations and transnational criminal networks.  This latter development 
necessitates greater capacity for effective state governance on behalf of societal interests. 
The studies of Collier et al. and Paris, however, show that effective attempts to end civil 
wars require strong domestic institutions that are capable of pursuing multifaceted policy 
programs.  These states must win the loyalties of diverse and often conflicting social groups, and 
they must therefore be able to make parties feel they have real stakes in the strengthening and 
perpetuation of government institutions.  At the same time, they must be able to regulate private 
actors that can disrupt peace or otherwise contribute to the exclusion of social groups.  States 
whose primary purpose is seen to be the promotion of markets and profit-seeking activities are 
unlikely to be effective at limiting the business activities of groups perpetuating violent conflicts.  
And the reduction of state capacities for affecting the distribution of resources contributes to a 
concentration of resources in the hands of small numbers of people who remain beyond the 
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control of weakened states.  These weaknesses of states contribute to the dynamics of the conflict 
trap discussed by Collier et al.66  In short lean, mean, neoliberal states are unlikely to be able to 
effectively govern the practices of transnational actors, even when this is vital to the maintenance 
of peace.  Nor are they likely to obtain legitimate authority necessary for reversing the trend seen 
by Kaldor and Luckham.   
 Another way that peacebuilding policies may constrain possibilities for states in post-war 
settings to escape from conflict traps is by privileging programs that emphasize profit-seeking 
over other social aims.  The key assumption behind neoliberal policies is that markets free of 
government intervention allow actors to engage in the free pursuit of profit that is expected to 
enhance overall economic well being.  But Collier et al. associate the pursuit of profit among 
groups engaged in civil wars with the perpetuation of these conflicts.67  While the conflicts 
themselves may not be grounded in explicit economic ambitions, as warring parties organize 
themselves to amass the resources needed to wage protracted conflict, they tend to become 
increasingly committed to profit-seeking activities during the course of armed struggles.  And 
these profit-seeking practices themselves often depend upon the maintenance of armed conflict 
or at least the absence of effective governance institutions.  Thus, the dynamics of wars interact 
with the incentive structures encouraged by neoliberal economic policies to reinforce conflict 
traps.   
 In sum, most analysts of conflict argue that effective peacebuilding work involves the 
construction of institutions that enjoy widespread legitimacy.  Such institutions must be 
democratic and effective at implementing popular preferences and curbing abuses of power.  But 
the privileging of neoliberal models of the modern state undermines both the legitimacy and 
political effectiveness of states.  This is particularly problematic in societies emerging from 
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armed conflict, where post-war institutions must expand the stakes of all actors in the new 
government and where high levels of inequality often require strong state capacities for 
economic regulation and redistribution. 
 
Peacebuilding and Global Governance 
A final assumption inherent in predominant models of post-conflict peacebuilding is that 
multilateral peace and security can be improved without addressing fundamental inequities in the 
global economic order.  While analysts have rightly identified the ways local and national armed 
struggles can threaten regional and global peace, the solutions offered typically fail to confront 
the ways that inequality in the global political order may be fueling more localized conflicts.  
Moreover, peacebuilding interventions that force warring parties to adopt market liberalization 
policies may be helping to perpetuate rather than reduce violent conflict.   
 Peace agreements encourage post-war states to become more integrated into a 
competitive global capitalist economy.  But as Paris warns, "[c]apitalism...is inherently 
competitive.  It inevitably creates winners and losers, which can fuel social unrest."68  Both Paris 
and Collier et al. argue for more cautious liberalization of post-war states, even as they maintain 
that integration into the global capitalist economy is an effective strategy for societies emerging 
from civil wars.  But if capitalism itself “inevitably creates winners and losers” thereby fueling 
social unrest, is the promotion of globalized capitalism an effective strategy for promoting local 
or global peace and security?   
While globalized capitalism has helped promote economic growth and new technological 
innovations, the ability of capitalist markets to maximize human well-being over the long-term 
has come under growing scrutiny.  Indeed, the prescriptions of Paris and Collier et al. 
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demonstrate that global markets are not sufficient for generating peace, and indeed I have argued 
that global markets can undermine the achievement of other conditions that are necessary for 
peace.  Collier et al., for instance, argue that new systems of international governance are needed 
to manage international trade in natural resources so that warring parties cannot use illicit trade 
to finance wars.  They also argue that poor states need global management of commodity prices 
to ensure the effective and stable governance of their countries.  And they see a need for greater 
global social solidarity to enhance the flows of aid from rich to poor countries.  Paris also 
emphasizes non-market policies aimed at fostering democratic cultures and empowering civil 
society.  But the policy prescriptions in these studies place primary emphasis on making changes 
in the governance of countries marred by civil wars rather than in the international system itself. 
A system-wide approach to addressing local and national conflicts, however, would lead 
us to question the extent to which the predominant, market-oriented approaches to peace 
agreements are likely to support long-term peace and security.  Can the international community 
impose models of economic governance on societies emerging from violent conflict and expect 
them to build effective and inclusive democratic institutions?  Can peaceful national and global 
societies exist within a global order that emphasizes economic competition and individual profit 
maximization?   
 These questions are vital, I think, to addressing the problem of violence in contemporary 
societies.  But most conventional approaches to international peacebuilding and conflict 
intervention neglect them.  If the global economic and political order is fueling conflicts at local 
and national levels, then national or local strategies will not, on their own, end the violence.  
Problems must be addressed at the level at which they originate, and thus strategic peacebuilders 
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must ask the tough questions about how the global system is implicated in more localized 
struggles.   
The UNDP Human Development Report argues that policies promoting social inclusion 
are necessary if we are to see a reduction in violence in contemporary societies.69  But as was 
stated earlier, the global capitalist system emphasizes economic competition, which necessarily 
excludes those without access to financial and material resources.  Social exclusion is a major 
effect of the global neoliberal order.  Thus, we must ask whether policies that enhance countries’ 
participation in global capitalist markets should be as central a part of the solution to violent 
conflict as predominant discussions make them. 
The privileging of globalized markets in the international policy discourse is also the 
result of highly unequal arrangements in the global political order.  The ideologies guiding 
global neoliberalism and the dissemination of market liberalization policies emerged from the 
rich countries of the global north, and they were aided by the support of elites in the global south.  
But poor countries and people had little role in shaping this policy agenda, and the policies of the 
World Bank and IMF have served to erode the national sovereignty of borrowing states in favor 
of donor countries.70  Thus, the policy agenda of market liberalization is not one that emerges 
from a democratic foundation of deliberation among sovereign equals, but rather it reflects long-
standing patterns of global domination and subordination.  It is unlikely, then, that this policy 
approach can be a foundation for a stable and democratic peace. 
The place of market liberalization in the international community’s hierarchy of policy 
priorities also reflects major inequities in the global system that threaten long-term global peace 
and security.  The international system is rife with contradictory policies and practices, and one 
of the most glaring is the tension between the international financial institutions and the United 
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Nations Charter.  The UN was designed to prevent wars and promote conditions that are 
conducive to international peace.  The World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organization, in 
contrast are part of the Bretton Woods system that aimed to expand global trade and international 
investment.  While the Bretton Woods system was initially to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
United Nations system, in practice the global financial institutions operate independently of the 
UN.  Their policies, moreover, are increasingly seen as being at odds with UN principles of 
equity, human rights, and environmental sustainability.71 
Over recent decades, the United States government and other key proponents of 
globalized capitalism have worked to systematically reduce the role of the United Nations in 
global affairs while making the global financial institutions more influential.72  The major effect 
of this policy has been to advance neoliberal agendas through largely coercive measures while 
subordinating other policy objectives to that of expanding global markets.  As a result, a 
comparison of global policy arenas reveals major contradictions among policy aims, outcomes, 
and norms.  For instance, market-oriented policies encourage economic growth, expanding 
consumption, and participation based on financial means.  In contrast, environmental 
preservation policies emphasize the limits of the natural environment and the precautionary 
principle.  And human rights policies emphasize equality, human needs, and universal rights of 
participation based on shared humanity.  The subordination of the UN to the global financial 
institutions has meant a prioritization of markets over sustainability and human rights.  These 
institutional contradictions complicate efforts to promote sustainable peace at local or global 
levels. 
Not only do institutional arrangements make it difficult to guarantee that policies 
promoting equity and sustainability gain at least equal footing with those promoting economic 
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growth, but they also are likely to complicate efforts to build democratic cultures that are 
conducive to peace.  An international system that prioritizes markets and economic growth 
places the aim of profit-seeking over other social objectives contributes to social exclusion and 
complicates governance at all levels.  Thus, policies that seek to restrain economic competition 
in favor of political or environmental security face important political hurdles.  Global 
neoliberalism has fostered an ideology of competition and “market fundamentalism” that—
despite losing some of its luster in recent years—work against efforts to foster democratic civil 
society and to promote a global culture of solidarity and human rights.73 
 In sum, creating a global economic context that prevents combatants from exploiting 
natural resources to finance civil wars, that provides poor country governments with predictable 
and stable sources of income, and that reduces rather than exacerbates inequalities of wealth and 
income requires fundamentally different approaches to peacebuilding from those emphasized in 
most mainstream policy discourse.  To reverse the escalation of internal conflicts and to foster 
stable and long-term peace, the international community must confront fundamental inequalities 
in the global system itself that are contributing to conflicts at local, national, and regional levels.   
 
Conclusion 
 Strategic peacebuilding requires an analytical framework that considers how local actors 
are embedded within broader economic and political relationships that extend beyond the 
national to regional and global levels.  While much intervention must take place at the level 
where violent conflict is experienced most directly, the analyses of the causes of civil wars and 
their perpetuation show that work must be done beyond local and national levels to address the 
causes of violence.  A global system that privileges markets and opposes state intervention in 
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economies also provides fertile ground for illicit trade that can help finance civil wars.  Policies 
that contribute to rising inequalities at global and national levels fuel grievances that can be used 
to mobilize groups against one another.  And an undemocratic global political order is unlikely to 
foster the values and cultural practices that will support democracy at other levels. 
 Major studies of international interventions in civil wars have concluded that market 
liberalization policies can undermine peace strategies.  Nevertheless, these studies continue to 
support the overall policy of market liberalization.  I would argue that we need to de-link the 
peacebuilding agenda from the neoliberal “globalization project,” which emphasizes economic 
growth and the globalization of markets at the expense of other policy objectives.74  While 
economic growth can expand resources available for peacebuilding, it is more important for 
policymakers in post-conflict settings to actively work to reduce inequality through redistributive 
policies.  And while market liberalization might encourage economic growth, the privileging of 
global over local and national markets may not serve the development needs of most post-war 
societies.  States require greater policy making autonomy and capacity for action than they are 
typically allowed in most peace agreements, trade agreements, and international financial 
agreements.75  There must be greater coordination and coherence in international policy 
prescriptions across different governance sectors to strengthen state capacities. 
 The 1980s and 1990s have seen a very rapid expansion of the global economic order, and 
the global political system needs to catch up if we are to have a global economy that serves the 
needs of people rather than corporations.76  Although there is widespread rhetorical support for 
the idea of democracy, we lack global institutions that can effectively protect democracy at local 
and national levels.  As governments bring more policy concerns to inter-governmental bodies 
like the United Nations and World Trade Organization, they effectively reduce democracy at the 
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national level.77  Following the work of Karl Polanyi (1944), we might argue that we need to 
embed the global economy within a global society that is guided by principles of equity, human 
rights, and environmental sustainability.78  Such a society will require major changes to global 
institutions to provide mechanisms for democratic participation and accountability comparable to 
those achieved in many national contexts.  In short, democracy at the national level will be 
increasingly reduced without steps to democratize global political and economic institutions. 
 How might this be accomplished?  One way is for peace intervention strategies to be 
more explicit in actively supporting a “democratic globalization network” that advances a more 
democratic global order.79 This democratic globalization network--which is largely centered on 
civil society actors, but also includes pro-democratic governments and international officials--
must be empowered to more effectively counter the network of transnational corporations and 
political elites that have systematically advanced their preferred model of neoliberal 
globalization.  Peace operations should serve to alter the relative balance of power between 
neoliberal and democratic agents.  Currently they are reinforcing the already vastly superior 
resources of neoliberals at the expense of democrats.  The policies and practices that enable 
democracy to flourish are not the same as--and in fact are contradicted by—policies that advance 
globalized capitalism.80  
 Thus, peacebuilders must prioritize policies that strengthen norms and practices 
conducive to democracy and human rights, rather than subordinating them to the needs of global 
markets.  This would mean, for instance, that policies aiming to reduce poverty should focus 
directly on putting resources into the hands of poor people rather than on expanding economic 
growth in the hopes that some new wealth will “trickle down” to those most in need.  It would 
also mean promoting policies that level the political playing field among citizens to promote 
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more inclusive debates and policies.  By taking steps to organizing global society around the 
values of cooperation and social solidarity rather than economic competition, the global 
community might help reduce new incidences of violent conflict while helping war-torn societies 
escape the conflict trap.   
Scholars of peace initiatives have long argued for greater inclusion of civil society groups 
and women into peace processes.  But these proposals have not been effectively incorporated 
into existing peacebuilding efforts.  Below I summarize three major strategies that this analysis 
suggests might enhance the prospects for enhancing civil society’s role in multilateral 
peacebuilding initiatives and the development of more effective and democratic strategies for the 
resolution of violent conflicts.81 
 First, leaders in movements and international institutions should support the development 
of more inclusive peacebuilding networks of non-state, governmental, and inter-governmental 
actors working to promote peace, democracy, and more equitable development.  These should be 
self-conscious conscious alliances between international agencies and civil society actors 
committed to core democratic and multilateralist norms, working together to engage both states 
and private financial actors in the tasks of more democratic global governance.  It is the relative 
imbalance of power between civil society and other actors that contributes to conflict escalation 
and persistent violence. Thus, activities of these multi-actor networks should aim specifically to 
reduce the inequalities of power between civil society actors, states, and the private sector and to 
promote democratic participation and accountability in governance.   
Second, multi-actor peacebuilding networks should focus in the near-term on efforts to 
democratize global institutions.  An overwhelming majority of UN member states favors a 
system that better reflects the interests of all its members.  Civil society groups would also 
 29 
benefit from a UN system that is more representative of all the world’s governments.  And 
finally, these reforms would enhance the commitment to the UN System by countries and civil 
societies that have been largely disenfranchised from global policy making.  These changes 
require focused efforts to bring together supportive governments and international officials and 
movement actors around a strategy for promoting UN and especially Security Council reforms, 
including, for instance, those recommended by the recent UN High Level Panel Report on 
Threats, Challenges and Change.   
Third, peacebuilding networks must be more proactive in their efforts to empower actors 
who have been marginalized by existing political and economic structures.  They must struggle 
to reign in the power of corporations in the global polity so that states and civil society actors can 
exert more control over decisions that affect their economic lives as well as their political 
choices.  Serious efforts are also needed to enhance democratic accountability and participation 
within states.  The recent report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations 
has some good recommendations around which policy makers and activists can mobilize, such as 
the call for a new “Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships,” with its own Under-
Secretary General, a Civil Society Unit, and an Elected Representatives Liaison Unit.   The 
World Social Forum process provides opportunities to make important connections among civil 
society actors in different parts of the world as well as between civil society and national and 
international officials.  This process should be supported financially and engaged more seriously 
by national and international policy elites as a possible mechanism for advancing a more 
equitable, democratic, and just global political order.  Such a global order is an essential 
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